

SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION OF THE TURKISH COMMUNITY IN DEVENTER, THE NETHERLANDS

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ABSTRACT

'Undivided city' is one of the basic objectives of current development strategies with the aim of integrating minority groups to the majority of population sometimes by destroying the ethnic identities in favor of social cohesion. One of the basic policies originates from discussions on ethnic dimension of residential segregation/concentration. Local governments propose developing heterogeneous/mixedhousing areas shaped by the renewal efforts. These kinds of policies consider a linear relationship between the concentration of different social groups (ethnic and/or social status groups) in housing areas -even if it is by law-and social cohesion and more precise a linear relationship between ethnic concentrations and the rising element of xeno-racism. The contemporary debate about the status of immigrants witnesses outbreaks of xenophobia/xeno-racism by a popular imagination of strong concentrations of muslim communities as 'threats to security'. In other words there is a linear relationship between the neighborhood effects - the behaviour of individuals are directly related with the neighborhood in which they live - (Kauppinen, 2006) and social exclusion directed by xeno-racist movements and policy formations.

Central in these discussions is an assumption that the civil disturbances have been sparked by the immigrants who have lacked assimilation (Cheong, et al, 2007). In this regard, especially second and third generation immigrants are accepted to be socially and economically excluded more with respect to their parents within the current economic conditions and their identity expectations in between their origins and the cultural sovereignty of a European Union country. However, destroying their social ties with their communities is in fact destroying their support in an environment in which they are excluded. Researchers prove the fact that there are other factors such as economic restructuring, transition from welfare society to market mechanisms, urban history, general housing policy and cultural orientation, in the residential segregation of immigrants (Deurloo, Musterd, 2001). Anti-immigration policies on the contrary, result in the empowerment of social solidarity networks reidentified within a system of ethnic and/or belief formations and strong (sometimes violent) resistance.

The aim of this study is to put forward the reasons of segregation and/or concentration of the immigrant Turks in the case of Deventer/the Netherlands to discuss policy concerns of social cohesion in a culturally diverse society. Thus social inclusion is clarified with an evaluation of the factors of segregation and concentration within the forms of 'institutional racism'.

1. INTRODUCTION

In many European countries, the popular imagination is currently being haunted by images of a Europe swept by foreigners, perceived as 'welfare-scrungers', 'job-snatchers' and 'threats to security' (Economist 2000 in Laachir, 2004). This new form of racism is related to what Balibar calls 'external groups', the ones blamed for crossing 'the threshold of tolerance', some of whom have been living and integrating (despite their cultural difference) in Europe for a long time (Balibar 1997 in Laachir, 2004).

The phrase further implies the 'belief' that strong concentrations of immigrants or ethnic minorities in specific places (or ghettos) constitute an obvious reason for social conflict. This argument is based on the (so far unproven) hypothesis that ordinary people become racists as a reaction to the increased visibility of immigrants (King 1995, Silverman 1992 in Laachir, 2004).

However, it has to become clear to a future European public consciousness that the European Union will need at least 1.6 million migrants a year to ensure the continuity of its workforce (Economist 2000 in Laachir, 2004). Europe's economy though prospering relies on an ageing population. Thus Europeans will have to face that immigrants are necessary and 'desirable' and that xenophobic fears of the 'other' must be overcome (Laachir, 2004).

1.1. Xenophobia/Islamophobia

Xeno-racism is used to describe the new racism that has emerged across Europe over the last ten years, especially following September 11, and is directed at those who, displaced and dispossessed by globalization, and are being thrown up on Europe's shores (Sivanandan, 2001 in Fekete, 2004). It is xeno in form in that it is directed against foreigners irrespective of colour; it is racism in substance in that it bears all the hallmarks of demonisation and exclusion of the old racism - and the mechanisms that set that foreign-ness in situ are legal and structural and institutional (Fekete, 2004).

In Slisli's words (2000 in Fekete, 2004) national security creates an exaggerated degree of fear and an exaggerated degree of threat in the name of "islamophobia". The Muslim, in this view, foments conflict: violence, war, militancy, terrorism, cultural dissension. He is a traditionalist, pre-modern, in the tradition of racial historicism difficult if not impossible to modernize, at least without ceasing to be 'the Muslim'. Thus it will be the duty of governments to overcome this problem mostly with the help of integration policies. However integration as used in most European government policies brings with itself the notion of "melting in a pot of uniqueness" irrespective of ethnical characteristics defined within a system of community networks also helpful to maintain in a foreign living environment.

Researches prove the fact that immigrant community networks are mostly structured with the elements of religious unity. Muslims have the solidarity networks that will bring participation in different areas. These networks will not be active if they give up the unity of Islam. In fact, destroying their social ties with their communities is destroying their support in an environment in which they are excluded. Government policies in favor of integration pushing them to melt in a pot of uniqueness may further increase the tension between the excluded and the others. Upper level relations are determined by prejudice: Muslims claim that the Europeans are the partisans of freedom and faithless, the Europeans however judge Islam for being reactionary and terrorist. As a reaction to the assimilationist policies of the European governments it is interesting that there is an increasing tendency of especially the third generation immigrants coming from Islamic countries to the radicalization of Islam and isolation from the mainstream society.

1.2. Segregation or Concentration?

Segregation is frequently based on race and ethnicity (Ratcliffe, 1998). Ethnicity includes factors such as cultural roots, 'religion and memories of a shared life,' and the sharing of an ethnic heritage is a significant criterion for living in the same space (Ratcliffe, 1998). Feeding on these cooperation patterns, socially excluded ethnic minorities mostly differ from the rest of the society spatially in urban space. Residential segregation becomes obvious when the members of a group are dense in some locations above the average and very scarce in others.

In line with the Neo-Weberian approach, housing is a scarce resource and different groups' access to this resource is also relative. Individuals differ from one another according to their power in the housing market (Rex, 1996). According to this approach, immigrants disperse into specific houses and specific neighborhoods based on their general preferences and constraints.

The debates that followed are constituted in two schools: the school of limitations and the school of ethnicity (Ratcliffe, 1999). According to the school of limitations, minorities suffer from the process of exclusion. Accordingly, the inadequate housing conditions with which the minorities face is results of external factors

which are the elements of racist discrimination in the individual or institutional structure (Ratcliffe, 1999).

Yet a weak exclusion theory brings forth an inadequate and uni-dimensional explanation: for example, regarding racism as the single cause of exclusion treats minorities as a single group regardless of their internal differences (Ratcliffe, 1998). In fact, these groups are not only culturally/ethnically different from the others but they also differ among themselves with respect to class, age, place of birth and sex, (Ratcliffe, 1998; Özüekren, Van Kempen, 2002; Musterd, 2005).

However, the foremost positive aspect of residential concentration is that it eases the desired cooperation in the unfamiliar living space. It provides the continuation and development of social relations. These social relations help protect the cultures of those groups which are outside the values and norms of the majority culture (Portes, Sensen, Brenner, 1993). This opportunity contributes to social development (Burgers; Wilson and Portes; Saunders and Nee; Portes and Zhou; Bailey and Waldinger qtd. in Van Kempen, Özüekren, 1998).

Yet with the advent of the 21st Century, it is usually the negative effects of spatial segregation that are emphasized. Those who live in these spaces are restrained from participating in the larger society fully as their options in the housing market are limited. Writers specifically emphasize the fact that exclusion and concentration limit peoples participation in the civil society. This limitation is a result of the lack of interaction between the related individuals and institutions. In the point of view of Burgers (1997), concentration of the long-term unemployed in a certain space makes unemployment inveterate. Those who live in concentrated spaces acquire a negative image in the society in the course of time. These results in the creation of self-feeding discourses and these spaces come to be regarded as places of shared wretchedness and as isolated places which are deserted by the majority of the society. This desertion not only physically but also intellectually destroys the empathy between the larger society and those who live in these spaces (Van Kempen, Özüekren, 1998).

3. CASE STUDY: SEGREGATION OF THE IMMIGRANT TURKS IN DEVENTER, THE NETHERLANDS

Deventer which is located in the southwest of the Netherlands takes place in the Overijssel Region with an area of 135 km² (Figure 3.1). It has a population of 96.458 (in 2006) which is composed of 78,9 % local, 12,4 % non-European and 8,6 % European ethnic groups, Turks having the biggest share (6,7 %) in non-European ethnic groups (Figure 3.2). Turks are also the most segregated/concentrated ethnic group in Deventer.



Figure 3.1. Location of Deventer in the Netherlands




Figure 3.2. Population distribution of groups in Deventer, which are not Dutch and the Turks

According to the questionnaire results, for the majority of Turks (90%) living in Regions 2, 3, and 4, and for 57% of those in the 1st Region, Deventer is the first place of settlement in the Netherlands. This indicates that those who arrived in the Netherlands for the first time chose locations which are densely populated by the Turks. They also (43% in the 1st Region, 23% in the other Regions) moved in with relatives. On the other hand, those Turkish immigrants who settled in Deventer afterwards, mostly (70%) preferred the city center where they would live alongside foreigners.

In Region 2, the Turkish population, which was 926 in 2004, has increased to 2492 in 2006, thereby indicating that the majority of Turkish immigrants arriving in Deventer in this two-year period has settled in this region.

In Region 3, the ratio of the Turkish population to the neighborhood population is the highest (21.4%), whereby those who are not Dutch (3564 persons) constitute approximately 45% of the Region's population. Moroccans and the Surinamese also reside here. Despite sharing the same religion, Turks do not establish communication or everyday relations with the Moroccans because of the Moroccans' tendency to commit crime and violence. Living areas in this Region, which is named as "Dertalan" (trouble area) by the Turks, consist of housing awaiting demolition, a primary education school mostly (92%) attended by Turkish children, a small trade center where traditional Turkish food is sold, and a Turkish style coffeehouse where men spend time.

3.1. Internal Factors

Internal factors of spatial segregation and/or concentration are explained by demographic structure, education level, economic structure and social and cultural structure.

3.1.1. Demographic Structure

The Turks living in Deventer are a young population (50.3% at or under 24). As a tool to strengthen social ties, marriage is realized at a high rate (57% in the 1st Region, above 70% in the other Regions).

3.1.2. Education Level

The education level of Turks displays an increase (50 %) parallel to double citizenship. In Region 1, education beyond the high school level increases with double citizenship. In the other Regions, the rate of Turks' participation in education is around 30 %. While the education level of the 1st Region, which has a low segregation level, increases, that among those living in segregated neighborhoods decreases.

A primary school teacher:

“[...] Ghettoization applies not only to the adults but also to the children. ... schools are replaced by Turkish associations whose training is not appropriate to this country although their defense zones may be powerful.”

Under these circumstances, training in Turkish and in religion is provided by the mosques and/or other Turkish associations (Photo 3.1).

Photo 3.1. Turkish Immigrant Children being Trained at a Mosque



Nevertheless, from the point of view of Turkish immigrants, it is not the Turks but the Dutch who create segregation:

“[...] With the arrival of Turks, the Dutch stopped sending their children to these schools which are, today, named as Turkish schools. As such, the children and the parents had no Dutch friends left in these schools.”

A Turkish immigrant:

“[...] When the Turks first arrived in the Netherlands, they were significant. Later on, the circumstances changed. First, the teachers alienated the students. Yet, the segregation in schools is not the only barrier in education. The first generation who are, at most, elementary school graduates and who have not improved themselves here are not helpful in the training of the new generation.”

3.1.3. Economic Structure

Turks are socio-economically at a middle or low level (13.600-14.600 € annual income per person, in the Netherlands 16.423 €).

Of the Turks living in Region 1, 43% are retired, 14% receive social benefits; the rest are paid workers and there exists no one with a poor financial status. In the 2nd Region, paid workers (34.5%) and the retired population (11%) constitute an important percentage. Regions 2 and 5 are the areas in which the most people depend on social benefits as a means of income (20%).

Turks in Region 1 hold professional careers or are retired; in Region 5, they are mostly workers and professionals, and in the other Regions, they are workers.

Most of the Turkish women are not working, not contributing to the family economy. Different individuals evaluate this from different perspectives.

An official in a Turkish Association:

“Turkish women who arrived in The Netherlands as housewives had difficulty finding jobs as they were not educated and they refused to work in marginal jobs (such as cleaning stores, babysitting, and the like).”

A politician with Turkish ancestry:

“Although there are approximately 300.000 open posts in The Netherlands, 600.000 are unemployed in the country. Regardless of sex, the unemployed are mostly those who retired early or those who are ill.”

An official in a health institution:

“Social benefits are abused among the Turks starting with the first generation. When factories started to lay off workers, both women and men found ways of

achieving early retirement due to incapacitation. Due to these negative examples, the young started to retire early and live on social benefits rather than working.”

3.1.4. Social and Cultural Structure

Among the Turks, transition to dual citizenship is common (approximately 60%). While dual citizenship is foregrounded in all the Regions, it is concentrated among the 45-60 age group and mostly the first generation; in Regions 2 and 3, it displays an even distribution, and in the 5th region, it is concentrated among the 31-45 age group (Table 3.1). While there exists no one in Region 1 with solely Turkish citizenship, this rate is around 30% in the other Regions. The rate of those who are only Dutch citizens is 14.3% in Region 1, 10% in Region 5, and an average of 3% in the other Regions. The fact that the rate of dual citizenship and Dutch citizenship is high in Region 1 may be taken as the first sign of assimilation.

Table 3.1. Citizenship According to Age Groups

Age Groups	1. Region			2. Region			3. Region			4. Region			5. Region		
	TC	Dual Citizen	Holland	TC	Dual Citizen	Holland	TC	Dual Citizen	Holland	TC	Dual Citizen	Holland	TC	Dual Citizen	Holland
-18								5,2							
18-30							6,1	10,2	3,4	13,8	32,2		2,5	20,0	5,0
31-45	8,3		8,5	12,0	22,4		17,1	19,7	7,6	10,5	18,4	2,3	7,5	32,5	2,5
46-60	8,3	66,7	8,2	17,2	25,7		12,4	8,8	1,4	5,2	7,2		20,0	7,5	2,5
60+				5,5	11,9			8,1		5,2	5,2				
Total	16,6	66,7	16,7	34,7	60,0	5,3	35,6	52,0	12,4	34,7	63,0	2,3	30,0	60,0	10

The new generation speaks Dutch better. Those who speak Dutch very well make up 71.4% in Region 1, 43.6% in Region 2, and 56% in Regions 3, 4, and 5 (Table 3.2). Nevertheless, teachers claim that even if Turkish students speak the Dutch language well, they will not be successful as they cannot think in this language

Table 3.2. The Proficiency in Dutch Language among Children according to the Language Spoken at Home

Languages		Missed	Very Good	Good	Bad	Intermediate	Total
1. Region	Both Languages			14,3			14,3
	Dutch		14,3				14,3
	Turkish		57,1				57,1
	Total	14,3	71,4	14,3			100
2. Region	Both Languages		32,7	0,9		6,5	40,1
	Dutch		0,9	18,2		2,7	21,8
	Turkish		10	24,5		3,6	38,1
	Total	6,4	43,6	43,6		6,4	100
3. Region	Both Languages	1,3	24	12		1,3	38,7
	Dutch		1,3				1,3
	Turkish	1,3	32	16	1,3	2,7	53,3
	Total	9,3	57,3	28	1,3	4	100
4. Region	Both Languages		41,9	11,6		4,7	58,1
	Dutch		2,3				2,3
	Turkish		11,6	23,3			34,9
	Total	2,3	55,8	37,2		4,7	100,0
5. Region	Both Languages	4,2	41,7	20,8			66,7
	Dutch						
	Turkish		14,6	14,6		4,2	33,3

	Total	4,2	56,2	35,4		4,2	100,0
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Turks living in Deventer frequently define themselves as Turkish but being Muslims is also a significant identity element. While the Turkish-Muslim identity is not accepted in Region 1 where integration is dense, 34.4% in Region 2 and 34.9% in Region 4 display the highest rates, which go down to 18.7% in Region 3 and 4.2% in Region 5. Throughout all the Regions, 55% of the 30-45 age group prefer only the Muslim identity (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3. Definitions of Identity

Identities	1. Region	2. Region	3. Region	4. Region	5. Region
Turk from Deventer	28.6	3.6	2.7	9.3	4.2
Muslim from Deventer	0.0	6.3	8.0	9.4	12.6
Turk from Holland	14.3	1.8	2.6	2,3	2,1
Muslim Turk from Holland	0.0	0.9	5.4	16.3	20.9
Turk	42.9	32.7	42.7	2,3	35,4
Muslim	0.0	14.5	9.3	25,6	20,8
Muslim Turk	0.0	35.4	18.7	34.9	4.2
Multicultural	14.3	0.0	6.6	0,0	0,0
Missed	0.0	3.6	4.0	100	100

A majority of the young living in Deventer do not define themselves as Turks. In the view of non-governmental organizations, children of Turks who are forgotten in The Netherlands by the Turkish government could become neither Dutch nor Turkish, thereby being left in-between in relation to identity and life style (42% of the 18-45 age group define themselves as from Deventer or as Dutch-Turkish).

3.1.5. Social Life and/or Socialization

In Regions 2, 3 and 4, a rather enclosed life style is carried out (50%), and customs and traditions (religious holidays, circumcision, weddings, rituals of birth and death, and the like) are preserved according to denominational differences and transmitted to future generations. Yet the Turks living in Region 1 where they interact more closely with the Dutch drift apart from such habits.

The social life is limited to their rather infrequent participation in various courses, charity bazaars, associational activities, sports activities, and trips within the country or abroad (usually to Turkey) organized by religious associations. The most significant social activity for the community is shopping at the bazaar set up at the city center on Fridays and Saturdays. The bazaar is also an essential place for communication and for dining together (Photo 3.3). Apart from the bazaar, shopping is done at Turkish markets (Photo 3.4).

Photo 3.2. Immigrant Turkish Women at the Bazaar at the City Center



Photo 3.3. Turkish markets in Deltaalan



Socialization process changes according to their definitions of identity and to the environment in which they are with the Dutch. Almost half of those who define themselves as “Turkish” and “Turkish-Muslim” and all of those who define themselves as “Dutch” or “foreign” indicated that they established close contacts with the Dutch. Only 10% of those who define themselves as “Muslim,” however, contact the Dutch closely, making it evident that those who define themselves through religion contact the Dutch less than the other groups. The proportional enormity of those who define themselves as multicultural or as Dutch in Region 1 is also traced in the level of close contact with the Dutch in business life.

It is observed that the Turkish immigrants’ close contact level with the Dutch in Region 1, where the Turks seem to have become integrated at the urban scale, decreases as they move from the city center. In establishing contacts with the Dutch, the fact of “coming into this country alone,” which makes contact with the Dutch obligatory when there are no Turks in the close environment, is also as significant as integration, which 57% of those living in Region 1 have stated.

Business life is also an important factor in the socialization process. It is realized that the Turks living in Region 1 prefer the Dutch in business life and, for this reason, they are ahead in the adaptation process. Outside the 1st Region, business life-based friendship and fellowship can only develop if people are from the same ethnic background. Hence Sunnites, Alaouites, and immigrants with Eastern background are dissociated in business life, and the connections based on being from the same town become distinctive in business and social life-based relations. On the other hand, business owners prefer family management, and, therefore, their contact with others remain at the minimum level.

Turkish students have indicated that they did not make friends with the Dutch not only because of language but also according to the desire of their families and the Dutch. Hence, Turkish students, especially at vocational schools, become introvert and segregated from other students (Photo 3.4).

Photo 3.4. Turkish Youth Dissociated from the Others at School



Turks who prefer an introverted life style are able to socialize primarily with Turks, and especially with their own families and relatives, and through visits and religious activities. Religious associations and mosques are the places that Turks visit often and socialize. Consequently, as adaptation to the foreign country is established, solidarity based on religion decreases.

Religion is a significant factor throughout all the Regions in the case of participation in non-governmental organizations. There are 145 associations under the Federation of Dutch Turkish Islam Culture Associations (HTIKDF), which is affiliated with the Dutch Trust for Religious Affairs. Turkish immigrants become members of these associations according to their religious denominations. Throughout the interviews, it was declared that the purpose of participating in these associations is not to enrich social life, which is true for the Dutch, but to achieve personal gain (receiving financial help, acquiring political power, and the like). There has been no membership traced among the Turks in any associations related to The Netherlands or to Deventer.

In relation to the institution of marriage, a major tool in socialization, 43% of the Turks in Region 1, 71% in Region 5, and 60% in the other Regions do not want their daughters to marry the Dutch. The basic reason for this has been explained as cultural differences in Region 1, and as firstly religion, then nationality and lack of trust in the other Regions.

All of those who define the treatment of the Turkish by the Dutch as hypocritical, discriminatory, degrading, and oppressive (60%) are those who have no contacts with the Dutch whatsoever. The fact that the same group has weak relations with other immigrants indicates that they become further introvert through discrimination. Only 1.3% of the Turkish immigrants regard the Dutch as friendly and 5.3% define them as “egalitarian and just.” These attitudes become the most distinctive barrier in sharing a social life with the Dutch.

Thus the advantages of living in the same neighborhood is solidarity (38%) and neighborliness (20%). However, all of those who do not intend to return to Turkey (40%) suggested that spatial segregation does not provide any advantages, and that, on the contrary, it becomes a barrier in integrating into The Netherlands (Figure 3.3).




Figure 3.3. Advantages of Living in the Same Neighborhood with the Turks

There exists the concern that living separately would not be tolerated by the Dutch government (4.2%), which is another disadvantage (Figure 3.4).




Figure 3.4. Disadvantages of Living in the Same Neighborhood with the Turks

3.2. External Factors

In the integration process of the Turkish community, the external factors are as determinant as the reasons for spatial segregation/concentration stemming from within the community.

3.2.1. Physical-Spatial Structure

In line with the housing policies of central management and of the State of Overijssel, in the regions where Turks are placed as immigrants, they have created living areas consistent with their own cultures. As such, Turks became dissociated by obligation in the 1960s and willingly in the 1980s, even surpassing the average population in some neighborhoods.

As such, Turks easily adapt to the housing policies and changes in The Netherlands. In the 1960s when they first immigrated, Turks lived in rented residences that the Municipality regarded as appropriate for them.

They usually prefer to buy houses through their desire to live in the environment they are accustomed to and with the ethnic group they belong to. The fact that houses for rent owned by the Municipality are sold for 20% less than the basic value (WOZ waard) determined by the market or related institutions has increased the Turkish immigrants' demands for these residences. Despite this practice that the Dutch mostly object to, Turkish immigrants who do not want to return to Turkey buy property through this system and regard this as a tool to make it easy for them to become permanent in The Netherlands. Hence Turkish immigrants who live together in houses owned by the Municipality as tenants and who carry over their life styles in Turkey into these neighborhoods have become or want to become property-owners in the same living areas. As these residential areas, known as Turkish neighborhoods, have lived through their physical life span, they will be demolished and rebuilt in line with the regeneration projects applied in these neighborhoods. Despite their inadequate financial standing, the Turks want to still be spatially segregated as an ethnic group, an outcome of their dependence on place. In other words, spatial segregation which started out as an obligation through tenancy is now being sustained out of will through property ownership or the desire to do so.

3.2.2. Policies on Immigration, Immigrants, and Integration

The draft law from 1983 concerning minorities, which the Dutch government developed through the integration policies started in the 1970s, proposes that the immigrants keep their own religions, cultures, and identities, just like citizens with Dutch origins (Bendrif, Haney, 2004). However, despite its multicultural structure, The Netherlands, like many other European nations, has changed its attitudes towards the immigrants following events of terror (like the September 11 attacks) in which Muslims got involved and multiculturalism began to be regarded as a threat.

The immigration policies changing in Europe in the 1980s and afterwards have been discussed in relation to social and spatial segregation and as religion-focused ethnicity-based. In the period following the Cold War, as well, the role of hostility towards Muslims and ethnic conflict in the formation of terror and its effect on culture has been questioned (Henkel, 2004; Freilich, Guerette, 2006). The increase in organizational activities since the end of the 1980s and the increased relations between Muslim institutions with the local and central government cause the Muslim voice to be heard more, thereby strengthening integration (Grillo, 2004). With especially mosques and mosque associations becoming more prominent among institutions belonging to the minorities (McLoughlin, 2003), issues such as immigration, minority policies, and illegal immigrants have begun to be discussed throughout the whole of Europe. As a result, although being against immigration has triggered anti-immigration parties (which have 3 seats out of the 150) in the Dutch Parliament as well, this has not created a huge threat on behalf of the immigrants. However, the disappointment and complications caused by multiculturalism in the country have been made a current issue (Bendrif, Haney, 2004), and terror attacks have resulted in justifying those who are against immigrations and in causing negative reactions towards the immigrants. Thus through ethnic or religion-based clashes reinforced by developments of this kind, new policies have been designed against immigrants, and racism and discrimination are more severely carried out than before in The Netherlands, as well. Viewed from the perspective of the immigrants, religions become a special power in the development of social solidarity and social capital.

3.2.3. Social (Dis)Integration and Return

Social (dis)integration is the most important factor that determines the continuity of life in a foreign country and/or contentment. The majority of Turkish immigrants (60%) has indicated that the European Union's integration policies create a concealed pressure and that integration has been replaced by assimilation, also stating that developments like these hamper integration. In the 1st Region, even the Turks who have achieved progress in the integration process (71.4%) claim discrimination and assimilation to be continuing. Turks in Region 1 have evaluated the point of view of the Dutch towards the Turkish through these policies as getting worse (57.1%). Those in the other Regions mostly (72%) believe the situation to be getting worse (Figure 3.5).




Figure 3.5. The Dutch View of the Turks

According to the living conditions and to the Dutch government’s policies that encourage return, 60% of the Turkish immigrants have stated that, after retirement, they would like to live partially in The Netherlands and partially in Turkey. All of those who live in Region 1, 29% of those in Regions 2 and 4, and 22% of those in Regions 3 and 5 refuse to go back permanently. 42.9% in Region 1 and 10% in the other Regions want to remain in The Netherlands. For reasons such as getting tired of living in a foreign country and suffering from homesickness, 60% of the Turks want to return permanently.

According to a politician a permanent return to Turkey took place in the first years that immigrants came to The Netherlands, and then, for the second time, after the September 11 events in 2001. While foreigners not only in The Netherlands but throughout the whole of Europe were regarded as a part of the cultural mosaic until this date, afterwards they were treated as potential dangers, and this has further triggered dissociation and discrimination. The negative politics towards foreigners that were initiated in 2001 with these developments in The Netherlands, caused 3000 young people between the ages 20 to 25, who were born and educated in The Netherlands, to return to Turkey in 2006.

4. CONCLUSION

The research findings prove the fact that Turkish immigrants in Deventer preserve their ethnic culture and identities and transmit them to future generations, and they live through difficulties in integrating to the native society because of their efforts to sustain these differences without transforming or adapting to place and time and of their resistance. Nevertheless in their integration problems, it is not only their sense of belonging based on ethnic structure and/or religion but also discriminatory policies that have become prominent in the post-September 11 period that are definitive factors.

Integration Problems: The second and third generation immigrants who have mostly overcome the problems of the first generation, live through difficulties related to preserving ethnic culture and identity and to discrimination. Yet in the community in general, the language problem, low education levels and economic negativities cause integration problems, and that this is related to the unskilled structure of the workforce as a result of low education. The fact that the Turks do not display any efforts in opening up to the outside, understanding others, and expressing themselves in these ongoing social and cultural inconsistencies and in ethnic and religious clashes has been regarded as the most vital factor.

Discrimination Policies: While terms such as cultural mosaic is frequently used in political discourses, Turks are still defined as “immigrant workers” in Deventer and their inclusion in the society is not desired. The anxieties of the Dutch increase as being Muslim is an important factor in exclusion. In the recent years especially, the agenda for the Turks consist firstly of xenophobia, discrimination, difficulty of finding jobs, language problem, health and education services, and demand for housing, and secondly of prejudice and cultural differences and the related immigrant policies.

The fact that segregation is created as a result of reasons stemming from the ethnic groups themselves and from outside the community indicates that this concept is formed through multi-layered and complex relations. Cultural diversity requires that planning instruments be both sensitive to and responsive to the social

needs of particular communities and any cleavage between social objectives and institutional instruments is further sharpened by multiculturalism (Qadeer, 1997).

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